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THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
IN THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE VALLEY, 1935-1955

MICHAEL WELSH

HISTORIANS OF NEW MEXICO have devoted little attention to the
causes and consequences in the past half century of the explosive
growth in the middle Rio Grande valley. The traditional perspective
of New Mexican scholarship prOVides too brief an understanding
of the political, economic, and social changes that have reshaped
present-day Albuquerque and its environs. Yet as the population
expands past the half-million mark and local leaders are pressured
to plan for the -future, they need an awareness of the recent past
to determine the wisest policies for the remainder of the century
and beyond.
A key to deciphering the mysteries of the modern era is an
assessment of water-policy planning for the Rio Grande basin. In
an area as devoid of surface moisture as central New'Mexico, the
use and abuse of precious water resources dictates all other factors
of growth and development. Prior to 1935, the sparse population
of the region required no elaborate policy making, but the combination of the Great Depression and the chaotic although exhilarating boom of World War II rendered obsolete the old methods
of water management. Henceforth, organized approaches by local
and state leaders had to coincide with federal plans for construction
of western water projects. These facilities contributed greatly to
the unparalleled expansion of the postwar years that shows no signs
of abatement in the Albuquerque area.
The vast majority of Albuquerque residents take for granted the
delivery of fresh water in generous quantities at low rates. Too
often they are not cognizant of the projects built since 1945 to
protect their city from periodic flood flows. Moreover, they know
0028-6206/85/0700-0295 $2.20
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little of the costs involved or the players in the drama of waterpolicy planning. Yet their lives and futures are different because
of the work conducted to prevent flooding in the middle Rio Grande
valley. One of these organizations charged with the duty of flood
protection has shaped local and state history to a surprising degree:
the Albuquerque District of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
The army engineers can point to a lengthy record of national
public service over the past two hundred years. In the nineteenth
century they provided the eastern United States with harbors and
levees, channel-dredging, and military construction. In the West,
the branch of the corps known as the Topographical Engineers
drew maps, conducted scientific surveys, and recommended policies to Congress that would utilize the resource potential of the
region. But the lack of settlement, and the isolation and remoteness
from urban centers, inhibited development of any large-scale corps
projects beyond the Mississippi River. It was left to the regionally
based United States Reclamation Service, founded in 1902 and
renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923, to begin construction
of irrigation facilities in western waters. Among these was Elephant
Butte Dam and Reservoir in southern New Mexico, completed in
1914, to serve farmers of the lower Rio Grande valley in New
Mexico and west Texas.
The presence ofthe Bureau of Reclamation in New Mexican and
other western river basins in the early twentieth century kept the
army engineers from active participation in regional water-policy
planning. Indeed, the ostensible mission of the corps to operate
only in navigable rivers excluded most western streams from their
purview. Only in 1927 did Congress authorize activities of the corps
throughout the West as part of House Resolution 308, which called
for surveys of flood protection and hydropower facilities in all United
States waterways. At the same time, the states of New Mexico,
Texas, and Colorado had attempted, with mixed success, to fashion
an interstate stream compact on the usage of the waters of the Rio
Grande. The need for technical assistance to conclude this important agreement thus became the vehicle for the army engineers to
enter the complex and challenging world of water-resource development in New Mexico. I
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By 1935 the river that held the lifeblood of central New Mexico
had undergone study by the state engineer's office, the International Boundary Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department ofAgriculture, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
(MRGCD), and other private irrigation companies. Despite an
overwhelming body of statistical data, the three compact commissioners from the affected states had doubts about the accuracy,
completeness, or what the New Mexico state engineer called the
"freedom from bias" in each agency's report. In this predicament
the federal government intervened, in the form of the National
Resources Committee, a New Deal organization devoted primarily
to the study of resource development in the West. Meeting twice
in Santa Fe in the winter of 1935-36, the committee sought clarification by asking the army engineers to join the Interior and
Agriculture Departments as part of the "Rio Grande Joint Investigation. "2
As a contributor to the formation of the Rio Grande Compactthe formal document on interstate stream use-the army engineers
gained invaluable knowledge about the appropriation of basin waters,
as well as the geology and topography of the region. Once these
studies had ended in 1938, the corps also established itself in the
area through its construction work at Conchas Dam on the Canadian
River near Tucumcari. After the completion of this project in 1939,
the corps served in an advisory capacity to state and federal agencies, such as the Works Progress Administration, on various small
retention and diversion dams in rural New Mexico communities.
Then in the spring of 1941 severe flooding along the midsection of
the Rio Grande brought a permanent presence for the soon-tobecome Albuquerque district in matters affecting the river.
Floods on the Rio Grande and its tributaries had been a fact of
life since time immemorial. Indian and Hispanic farmers who operated at a subsistence level worked around the flooding by waiting
for its arrival each spring and then planting their crops in the highly
fertile sediment deposited in the flood's wake. The American system of farming, however, involved massive production of surplus
crops for sale in a larger market economy. This practice meant
increasing the length of the growing season, the size of one's fields,
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and the volume of water used thereon. Spring floods then constituted a danger, not a blessing, to such organized methods of agriculture, and as more settlement occurred the need for flood control
grew accordingly.
This greater use of the river by farmers and city dwellers became
obvious after 1900. Since the Rio Grande flows through a desert
environment, it absorbs sand and dirt in large quantities as it scours
the river bed. This action decreases the volume of clear water
needed for fields cultivated with fertilizer. In addition, the excessive pumping of wells in the basin reduced the water table so that
the amount of irrigated land in the middle valley had declined by
two-thirds, from 125,000 acres in 1880 to less than 40,000 acres in
the 1930s. The stream bed was also rising as silt was deposited
every year, and where farms were lower than the shoreline the
groundwater seeped to the surface, killing the vegetation and leaving swamp and marshland behind. 3
At first the citizens of the river valley attempted to control their
water problems through formation of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. After a particularly difficult spring in 1917, water
users incorporated to pass bond issues that financed construction
of levees, irrigation canals, drainage ditches, and later a storage
pool at EI Vado Dam in northern New Mexico. Problems caused
by the Dust Bowl and the Depression combined with Albuquerque's small population base and low per capita income to convince
the conservancy district to seek outside help. In 1938 the Soil
Conservation Service made recommendations on the sediment
problem, and the next year the Bureau of Reclamation conducted
a preliminary survey on flood control and hydroelectric power facilities. Then in 1941, when the Rio Grande flooded almost nonstop
for two months, valley residents asked the corps of engineers for
their expertise as well. 4
The Galveston district of the army engineers first responded to
the flood situation on the Rio Grande, since it controlled the stream
flow of that river in southern Texas. But when the Albuquerque
district opened its doors in early 1942, all work on the New Mexico
reach transferred to the local office. The pressures on the new
district to complete its many military construction projects left little
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time, staff, materiel, or money for flood protection work. The conservancy district thus had to maintain its levees throughout the
war years-a task made more difficult by its precarious financial
situation. Tax assessments to property owners increased dramatically, yet the district spent an inordinate percentage of its funds
on flood damage, rather than on enlarging the irrigable acreage of
the valley. 5
The crises facing the Albuquerque area disturbed many residents, not the least being First District U. S. Congressman Clinton
P. Anderson. Elected to the House of Representatives in the fall
of 1940, the Democrat quickly learned in Washington how officials
from other states manipulated the levers of power to acquire public
works projects. Anderson's Albuquerque could not fund any large
facilities, and the outstanding conservancy district bonds had no
takers until the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation had
purchased them in 1935. As tales of flooding on the Rio Grande
filtered back to Anderson in the spring of 1941, he watched the
federal budget process closely. Anderson first asked the Bureau of
Reclamation to assume the district bonds, as that would free conservancy district members from the debt service on their loans.
When that move failed, the Congressman learned that some western water projects, especially those the army engineers funded,
could be built on a nonreimbursable basis. Conchas Dam had been
constructed in such a manner, and the repayment schedule for the
proposed Arch Hurley Irrigation District at Conchas received very
liberal terms from the Bureau of Reclamation. Anderson did not
begrudge the farmers around Tucumcari their good fortune, but
he called upon "the people of Albuquerque and the middle Rio
Grande valley, the newspapers ofAlbuquerque, and the Legislature
of the State of New Mexico to get a little 'hot' on this subject." The
city needed "millions more spent" on flood control, and Anderson
believed that it "ought to be spent in an area where people are
already living and in distress."6
The flooding of 1941 helped Anderson's bill for flood protection,
House Resolution 4911, to pass both houses of Congress -in short
order. Public Law 78-534, known as the Flood Control Act of 1941,
directed the Chief of Engineers to conduct a preliminary study of

Clinton P. Anderson. Courtesy Special Collections, University of New Mexico
Library.
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the basin and its tributaries north of EI Paso. Anderson also detected a potential for conHict with the Bureau of Reclamation, the
other agency working in the river basin, when he added a clause
~requiring both groups to develop ajoint-use plan for the Rio Grande
near Albuquerque. Anderson hoped to avoid the bitter dispute
between the corps and the bureau unfolding in the Missouri River
valley that threatened future funding for that region. The Bureau
of Reclamation agreed with Anderson to study irrigation and water
conservation measures, while the Albuquerque district of the army
engineers would plan for Hood control and sediment storage via
reservoirs and levees.
The pace of change in the Albuquerque area caused by military
spending in World War II hampered the study of the Rio Grande
basin and left Clinton Anderson in a quandary. He saw the potential
for postwar economic growth in his district if only he could fashion
a network of transportation and communications for Albuquerque.
In his mind the federal government had the largest source of capital
to invest in the city's future. If he could not overcome the obstacles
of Hood control and irrigation, that future stood in jeopardy. Anderson then resurrected an idea that had met opposition in the
West just prior to World War II: the concept of a regional water
authority. Under this scenario, Congress would develop not only
Hood and irrigation projects, but water recreation faCilities and
inexpensive hydropower as well. Were Anderson to convince his
colleagues in Washington and New Mexico of the merits of such a
plan, the federal government would underwrite nearly the entire
cost of economic expansion for the middle Rio Grande valley, much
as it had done in the South with the Tennessee Valley Authority
in the 1930s.
To meet this urgent need, Anderson went before Congress in
the spring of 1945 with a bill entitled "Upper Rio Grande Reclamation Act of 1945." The legislation covered the drainage area of
the basin from its source in southern Colorado to San Marcial, a
town north of Elephant Butte Reservoir that Hooding had destroyed
in 1929. Anderson chose to work with the secretary of the interior
on this matter, giving that agency "such powers as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this act. "The sale of hydropower would
be a major component of any storage reservoir constructed on the
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river, with profits from the electricity to offset the costs of the
projects. Finally, the Corps of Engineers would be responsible for
flood control only, with all other uses of their projects ma~aged by
the Interior Department. 7
From his vantage point in Washington, Anderson believed that
his "Rio Grande Basin Authority" (RGBA) made eminent sense.
The Columbia River projects of the corps and reclamation in the
Pacific Northwest generated large quantities of cheap power that
transformed that area into a haven for agribusiness and defense
plants. The prevailing attitude among many New Deal supporters
still held true in the 1940s: that national solutions were best for
persistent problems of unemployment and economic stagnation.
But Anderson either forgot the lessons the corps learned when it
advanced the ill-fated Arkansas Valley Authority in 1941 or thought
that emergency conditions in wartime offered a compelling rationale for his RGBA. Anderson contacted influential backers in New
Mexico for their opinions, only to be stunned by their near-unanimous rejection. 8
The concerns of Anderson's constituents reflected the economic
and political dilemma they faced in World War II. Oscar M. Love,
president of the Albuquerque National Bank, told Anderson that
"development of the Rio Grande ... is perhaps the local matter
of transcendent importance to every citizen and owner of property
within the area." Fred C. Wilson of the conservancy district noted
that Joseph O'Mahoney, Democratic senator from Wyoming, had
pressed for similar legislation for the Upper Colorado River basin,
with "construction of the works at the entire expense of the United
States." All respondents sympathized with the Congressman's objectives. But the idea of the federal government taking direct responsibility for management of New Mexico water resources alarmed
local leaders, and they made Anderson aware of their hesitancies. 9
The critical evaluation of the RGBA proposal quickly expanded
beyond the Albuquerque area to the states of Colorado and Texas.
Clifford H. Stone, director of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board, echoed the displeasure of his state as a member of the Rio
Grande Compact Commission. Stone held that all basin authorities
were "wrong in principle in every respect." Federal officials would
not be sensitive enough to the water laws of the various western
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states and would find restrictive "the right of the states of the arid
West to control the appropriation and distribution of water." Colorado discounted Anderson's claim that basin-wide management would
further economic vitality, contending that the RGBA would "delay
rather than expedite desirable developments." Stone did not leave
the Congressman without hope, however. He saw in several actions
of the army engineers an attempt to resolve disputes in river basin
planning and recommended that Anderson study the latest flood
control and rivers and harbors bills, which guaranteed state control
of water rights. Stone then warned Anderson that the Albuquerque
District had to remain a strong partner in Rio Grande basin projects: "An attempt to relegate to them a minor role, or eliminate
them entirely from the field of water development ... will only
tend to unduly discourage and delay what is needed for the proper
utilization . . . of the water resources of that area."10
The other participant in the Rio Grande Compact, the state of
Texas, also moved to register its dissent with the Anderson proposal. Terrell Bartlett, a civil engineer from San Antonio who had
clients on the river below Elephant Butte Dam (technically considered part of the Texas reach of the Rio Grande), called the
preliminary plans of the corps and reclamation"grandiose. " Bartlett
not only disapproved of the authority concept, but believed that
many of the proposed projects would waste money and not deliver
on their promises. He called for less glamorous, but in his estimation more effective work, like raising of levees, dredging the
river channel for a deeper, swifter flow, and more attention to the
problems of evaporation and sedimentation in any reservoir under
study. The goal of Bartlett and other interested water officials in
Texas and New Mexico was quick and efficient delivery of all compact waters to Elephant Butte as soon as flooding occurred further
north, so that lower valley farmers would have enough irrigation
water to last through the summer. 11
Under the onslaught ofcriticism for his basin bill, Anderson chose
discretion. He wrote to Thomas McClure, state engineer for New
Mexico, to calm his fears about the authority's intent and purpose.
The congressman had no desire to "set up an appointive board in
Washington, which knows nothing of conditions in New Mexico."
Any commission fOf the RGBA, he added, would be "composed of
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people resident within the area" and would be selected "by the
President [with] the advice and consent of the Senate." Anderson
still considered his plan meritorious, telling McClure th~t federal
control of the operations and management of any flood protection
work was standard procedure throughout the West. He did admit,
however, that the impact of the RGBA on the delivery of compact
waters had not crossed his mind, but promised to negotiate with
the states on that point. Anderson reassured McClure that he had
not sold out the interests of his state or of Albuquerque with the
authority bill and concluded that "we all know what New Mexico
needs, wants, and ought to have, and our feelings are not far
apart."12 '
The battle for the RGBA changed character in 1945 when Clinton
Anderson resigned from his seat in Congress to accept the position
of secretary of agriculture in President Harry S. Truman's cabinet.
Although Anderson would maintain his interest in flood control and
irrigation projects for the basin, it would be left to New Mexico's
senior senator, Dennis Chavez, to fulfill the expectations of Rio
Grande valley water users. Chavez would assume coordination of
the various plans under the aegis of the Middle Rio Grande Project
(MRGP), and when he became chairman of the Senate Public Works
Committee in 1949 he would exert great influence on the funding
of army engineer projects nationwide.
As a lifelong resident of the Rio Grande valley, Dennis Chavez
knew first-hand the problems of flood control and sediment protection. His family lived in the small community of Los Chavez,
south ofAlbuquerque, where Chavez developed his understanding
of the New Mexico Democratic party and its important Hispanic
component. Clinton Anderson often spoke for the business and
professional interests of New Mexico, given his background as an
insurance agent who had come to the state to recuperate from
tuberculosis in 1917; but Dennis Chavez, on the other hand, paid
close attention to the concerns of small farmers and landowners
throughout the valley, and he knew that they too must share in
any improvements brought by the army engineers and other federal
agencies. David M. Cargo, former Republican governor of New
Mexico (1966-70), characterized Chavez's perspective on water
policy as "practical dreams," and it was Chavez's diligence and
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consensus-building in Congress that carried the day for the Rio
Grande basin where Clinton Anderson had gone astray. 13
Prior to 1945, Chavez had devoted his energies in the Senate to
acquiring military contracts for the state and New Deal social programs for his constituency. His forays into water development consisted of support for funding of Conchas Dam in 1935 and introduction
of bills to construct small flood protection works in northern New
Mexico. But the RGBA debate brought Chavez into the picture
when he agreed to write an article on the issue for the New Mexico
Quarterly Review. The senator also worked on passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1944, which added several tributaries of the Rio
Grande to the original corps study, and it also called upon such
disparate federal agencies as the Federal Power Commission, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, and Soil Conservation Service to join
the Albuquerque district and the Bureau of Reclamation in developing a comprehensive basin report. 14
The deliberative pace of the federal bureaucracy irked the activist
Chavez, especially when the Middle Rio Grande Project report
did not surface in time for the off-year Congressional elections of
1946. The evident backlash against Democratic social programs,
postwar inflation, and the suspected Communist menace of the
Cold War, made Republican fortunes bright that fall. Chavez saw
two problems on the horizon: one for himself and the other for the
MRGP. His re-election campaign pitted him· against Patrick W.
Hurley, secretary of war in the administration of Herbert Hoover,
and a former general in the army. In addition, a Republican sweep
ofthe Senate might doom federal support for western water projects
since budget-cutting and criticism of "big government" provided
the GOP with ammunition in all contested races.
To deflect the attacks of Hurley, et al., and to insure success of
the MRGP, Chavez made an issue of Republican insensitivity to
public works and social programs. He also issued an unsigned
statement on the eve of the election warning New Mexico voters
that Arizona Senator Carl V. Hayden, a Democrat who championed
western water projects, could be replaced as chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee by Senator Styles Bridges, a Republican from New Hampshire. Chavez depicted Bridges as "a
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reactionary easterner" who knew "nothing of the West and cares
less." By inference Chavez painted his opponent with the same
brush. To save Hurley's candidacy, Bridges responded immediately
by telegram to the Albuquerque Tribune. The New Englander
reminded New Mexicans that a Republican, Theodore Roosevelt,
had supported funding of Elephant Butte Reservoir in 1906 and
that Secretary of War Hurley had authorized the corps to conduct
its survey of the middle Rio Grande. Bridges had visited New
Mexico on several occasions and assured Tribune readers: "I have
been and am now in favor of flood control that will protect the
magnificent city of Albuquerque . . . and I shall be very glad to
work with you [Dennis Chavez], Pat Hurley, and all others interested to that end. "15
Chavez and the Democrats did lose control of the U. S. Senate
that year and had to wait until the Truman upset of 1948 to regain
their positions of power in that body. Once back in command of
the Congress, the Democrats named Chavez to head the Public
Works Committee. In the summer of 1949 he received the longawaited Rio Grande report from the secretary of the army and
moved for quick action on its recommendations. The report, known
as House Document No. 243, 81st Congress, 1st session (HDoc
243), did call for extensive construction in New Mexico, but also
revealed the complexity of water management in the Southwest.
No less than five federal agencies worked on HDoc 243, along
with the Rio Grande Compact commissioners for New Mexico,
Texas, and Colorado. The Flood Control Act of 1948 had authorized
several projects, the most prominent being Chamita Dam above
Espanola, Jemez Canyon Dam above the town of Bernalillo, and
flood protection for the middle Rio Grande valley. The act also
recommended projects to control the heavy sedimentation of the
river and to upgrade the present irrigation systems to gain efficiency. Federal officials took notice of the memorandum of agreement signed between the interior secretary and the chief of engineers
on 25 July 1947. This statement delineated the areas of responsibility for the corps and reclamation in the Rio Grande basin. The
director of the Bureau of the Budget, Frank Pace, Jr., hailed this
cooperative posture and commented: "It is gratifying to note the
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high degree of coordination.... Both agencies are deserving of
commendation for such an achievement. "16
Despite these words of praise, the budget director also could
not ignore the number of deficiencies in the report. Many of the
agencies involved, including the Park Service, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Geological Survey and Soil Conservation Service, had
yet to file their recommendations, and thus the survey of 1949
lacked sufficient data on soil erosion and retention of silt. In addition, Colorado and Texas expressed concern over the amount of
water stored in the basin and the operation of the proposed facilities, while New Mexico worried about meeting its delivery schedule to Texas under the Rio Grande Compact. But of all the aspects
of the Middle Rio Grande Project study, most objectionable was
the flood control dam and reservoir at Cerro Chiflo, north of Questa
on the upper reach of the river.
The Albuquerque district's plans for Chiflo Dam drew the special
attention of Colorado water authorities. Their estimate of the savings the facility offered showed that Chiflo would cost three times
as much to maintain each year ($1.26 million) as it would offer in
flood protection benefits ($384,000). The damsite would be too far
north of Elephant Butte Reservoir to effect sedimentation control
since only 1 percent of the basin's silt flowed past Chiflo. Forty
percent of the floodwaters of the Rio Grande came from the Rio
Chama above Espanola, and the army engineers did not plan to
advance construction on that stream in the near future. To help
cover the costs of building Chiflo Dam, the corps had suggested
placing hydroelectric power works at the site. Colorado, however,
feared that storage of water at Chiflo would endanger similar plans
for the San Luis Valley project, authorized in 1940 and as yet
unfinished. Finally, Colorado was not sure that the Rio Grande
Compact would permit waters to be stored for long periods that
far north .. The damsite had not been thoroughly tested for watertightness, and the seepage into underground wells would drain
away the flow that needed to remain in the channel. 17
Criticisms of Chiflo disturbed Senator Chavez, who had pushed
for its construction by the Albuquerque district. Chavez saw the
project as providing a multipurpose water resources facility for the
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Hispanic farmers of the Taos-Questa region of northern New Mexico and especially as a source of low-cost electricity for an area.
among the poorest in the nation. Still, as negative commentary
built on the subject of Chitlo, this criticism loomed as a threat to
the funding of the entire basin project. To limit the damage, Chavez
sent word to the Albuquerque district that no employees engaged
in drilling core samples at the site were to discuss their work with
the general public. The final version of the 1949 report requested
that Congress remove Chiflo Dam from the overall planning, either
to be replaced by a dam near Jaroso, Colorado, or to be eliminated
altogether. 18
Regardless of his preferences on Chiflo, Dennis Chavez believed
that the entire Middle Rio Grande Project had to be enacted quickly
to spare central New Mexico the devastation of 1941. The opportunity to employ hundreds of workers at salaries comparable to
World War II wages also spurred the senator because the postwar
recession had proven long-lasting for unskilled and semiskilled laborers in New Mexico. Even before the report of the army engineers became public, Chavez called upon the newly seated EightyFirst Congress to enact legislation giving reclamation and the corps
a combined national budget of $53 million for new water projects.
Of this, more than $1.2 million would be needed for starting the
MRGP. 19
Senator Chavez realized that his proposed legislation might confuse many senators not supportive of western water projects and
resorted to a variety of tactics to gain approval for his measure. He
drummed up testimonials from the Santa Fe Railway to prove his
contention that Rio Grande basin flooding disrupted communications and transportation almost every spring. The railroad even
composed a two-page handbill detailing all major floods on the
river since 1874, listing crop and track damage, loss of life, and
costs of repair. Maj. Gen. K. D. Nichols, chief of the Special Weapons Project at Sandia Base in Albuquerque, informed Chavez that
any loss of services would hinder the work of the nuclear missile
program there. Similar commentary came from David Lilienthal,
former director of the TVA and then-chairman of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission. Lilienthal worried about "rail, air and
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road communication for both the Los Alamos and Sandia Laboratories." The railhead at Albuquerque had to be protected so that
shipments of uranium products and nuclear devices met no harm. 20
Encouraged by these letters of support, Chavez called upon
Albuquerque municipal water officials to testify before his committee. John P. Murphy, executive secretary of the Middle Rio
Grande Flood Control Association,· wrote to Chavez offering his
services as a' witness. The chairman responded with recommendations for Murphy's remarks so as to strengthen the case of the
MRGP. "Although the Corps of Engineers will be represented,"
said Chavez, "and will furnish technical data, I believe it would be
very much to your advantage [to] be reasonably well posted on
such several matters pertaining to the physical aspects of the river
and its problems." Committees that held lengthy hearings were
often "much more favorably impressed with clear, concise statements," and Murphy should not read from a prepared text if at all
possible. Chavez needed Murphy's statement to justify another
increase to $3.5 million for the first phase of the MRGP, and he
knew that Murphy would "be questioned somewhat extensively on
almost any aspect of the project. "21
The New Mexico senator's efforts to fund construction of the
MRGP went for naught in 1949. He then prepared new legislation
to increase nationwide water project funding to sixty million dollars,
which included $750,000 for preliminary studies of Jemez Canyon
Dam, north of Bernalillo. Chavez then scheduled hearings of his
Public Works Committee in the state on 9-19 January 1950. The
group would visit Carlsbad and Roswell, observing the work of the
Albuquerque district in the Pecos River basin. Then committee
members would adjourn to Albuquerque, where they would be
confronted with the necessity for the MRGP. 22
.
The session with the Senate committee convinced Chavez, the
corps, and local proponents of the Middle Rio Grande Project that
Jemez Canyon dam offered the best hope of initial construction of
Hood protection works for the Albuquerque area. Its proximity to
the metropolitan center, its large storage capacity, and its price tag
of $7.2 million made it easier to pass through Congress than the
$27 million needed for the defunct Chiflo site or the $28 million
being discussed for Chamita Dam near Espanola. On 4 May 1950,
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the Albuquerque district awarded a contract for construction of an
access road and outlet works, amounting to $236,000. Chavez and
the corps congratulated themselves on their good fortune and could
almost ignore the decrease in the fiscal year 1951 budget for Jemez
Dam from one million dollars to $500,000. The project had begun,
and Congress rarely halted production of a facility once monies had
been expended. 22
As the New Mexico congressional delegation pressed their case
for Jemez Canyon dam in Washington, events far away in East Asia
threatened another round of budget cuts and termination of the
MRGP. In the fall of 1950 President Truman committed U. S. military forces to the growing conflict between North and South Korea.
While this action meant additional authorizations for military construction branches of the Albuquerque district, it also drained away
staff, materials, and funds from the civil works segments engaged
with Jemez Canyon dam. The risks of flooding did not abate, nor
did the rate of sedimentation decrease in the Rio Grande basin.
Yet the war effort led many in Congress to scrutinize more carefully
all nonmilitary portions of the budget. As funds for water projects
shrank, interagency disputes over jurisdiction threatened whatever
public works money Congress did appropriate. In the face of such
conflict and tension, Dennis Chavez fought for any and all funds
he could get for the MRGP.
The prevailing mood of economizing in government in the early
1950s resurrected interagency disputes over water projects that
had lain dormant during the years of rapid growth and increasing
expenditures. The culprit in the eyes of the corps was the Bureau
of Reclamation, whose constituency resided within the seventeen
western states that organization served. While the Albuquerque
district had reached a compromise with reclamation in the Rio
Grande basin, differences of opinion about missions and delivery
of services emerged during the war years. The Albuquerque district
was not alone in this regard, and the crisis prompted Gen. Samuel
D. Sturgis, chief of engineers, to draft a statement of concern about
similar feuding nationwide.
Convinced of the wisdom of the corps's approach to water policy
in the West, and believing that reclamation operated within a more
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narrow framework, Sturgis spoke bluntly about the future relationship between the agencies. "Differences are usually not technical," the chief acknowledged. They stemmed from the "more
nebulous realm of the political or social philosophy of water resource development." Sturgis viewed reclamation's goal as "greater
centralized authority" over western water. In so doing the bureau
moved "with the trend of the time . . . during the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations." To his way of thinking, the corps did not
commit this sin of "empire-building." The army engineers had "followed a fairly consistent course of recognizing local and state rights,"
the chief contended, "of federal participation rather than control;
and of leaving policy making in the hands of Congress. "23
Sturgis then outlined several areas where reclamation appeared
to overreach its legislated authority. These included its desire to
utilize all waters in corps flood control reservoirs for irrigation;
management of their own flood protection facilities; and attempts
to appropriate hydroelectric power from corps projects to sell to
their own customers rather than have the proceeds returned to the
U.S. Treasury. Sturgis listed a number of western river basins
where confict had already surfaced and then highlighted the agreement of 1947 between reclamation and the Albuquerque district.
Giving Rio Grande channel rectification to the bureau, Sturgis
thought, was a "shotgun affair"; a reference to a forced compromise.
Sturgis suspected that New Mexico politicians had wanted to placate reclamation when they knew that the bulk of Rio Grande
projects belonged with the corps. "This is actually our type ofwork,"
the chief concluded, leaving no doubt as to the nature of the corpsreclamation relationship. 24
Frayed nerves all around involving the Middle Rio Grande Project reached their peak when colleagues of Dennis Chavez, and
finally General Sturgis himself, took the senator to task for his
handling of the affair. Senator Guy Cordon, a Republican from
Oregon, disliked Chavez's attempt in 1952 to revive the funding
cuts for the Jemez Canyon dam without the support of the Bur~au
of the Budget. Having sat through a series of witnesses lamenting
Albuquerque's fate without flood protection, Cordon interrupted
the testimony of the corps officials to exclaim: "It seems to me that
[the MRGP] cried aloud for the earliest possible action at the
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earliest possible minute. I cannot understand why work was not
commenced the minute there was authorization. "25
The army engineers in Washington mirrored Cordon's frustration
at the lack of progress in the Rio Grande basin and adopted countermeasures to deflect future criticism. By late 1954 General Sturgis had tired of the inability of Dennis Chavez to deliver local
support for the MRGP. He vented his frustration by labeling the
corps's presentation to the New Mexican senator as the "Chavez
background." Sturgis encouraged his staff when speaking before
Chavez to use maps "in rustic but clear and adequate style" in order
to "save manpower." As for the project itself, Sturgis asked his aides,
"What risks have we accepted in going along with Senator Chavez?"
The chief of engineers doubted that the senator could grasp the
complexity of all the legal, financial, political, and bureaucratic
tangents to the MRGP and told his subordinates no longer to assume "a position of caution and appeasement" with Chavez. 26
This rift between Chavez and Sturgis did not surface in public,
and the effects of their troubled relationship cannot be measured
accurately. In the federal budget for fiscal year 1952, Chavez inserted $900,000 for completion of the outlet works at Jemez Canyon
dam, despite the wish of the House Appropriations Committee for
no monies. The following year identical circumstances obtained,
but Chavez joined with Clinton Anderson to gain $2.1 million for
the bulk of construction. The Albuquerque district began closing
the 136-foot high dam in August 1952 and two months later had
opened the sluice gates for testing. Once completed, the dam
stretched 780 feet across the canyon and contained 120,000 acrefeet of flood and sediment control storage. The fight for Jemez
Canyon dam had ended, leaving interested observers to wonder
at the volume of acrimony and intrigue awaiting later segments of
the Middle Rio Grande Project. 27
The completion in 1953 ofJemez Canyon dam marked a turning
point in the history of the Albuquerque district and the planning
for the middle Rio Grande basin. With its first large flood protection
facility in place, the corps could direct its attention to the challenges
of the remainder of the MRGP:high dams at Chamita and Abiquiu
and a floodway through Albuquerque. Several small items remained for Jemez Canyon dam, not the least being $310,000 worth
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of levee protection for the pueblo of Santa Ana, directly upriver
from the dam. The Santa Ana people had granted easements to the
army engineers in return for protection from the storage of water
at flood stage. When an abnormally high spring runoff in 1958
created the need for nearly 70,000 acre-feet of flood storage behind
the dam, pressure from Albuquerque residents mounted for retention of the pool to provide recreation. H. Cook's sporting goods
store, the only local dealer in motorboats, sold more than one
hundred pleasure craft while the corps held the waters of the Jemez
River in check. But permanent storage would mean damage to
Santa Ana farm and grazing lands as well as violation of the Rio
Grande Compact delivery schedule of excess waters to Elephant
Butte Reservoir. Albuquerque was still without a recreational pool
nearby; a situation that would obtain until completion of Cochiti
Lake by the army engineers in 1973. 28
As the citizens of the middle Rio Grande valley contemplate
their future, they must reflect on those factors of economics and
politics that have merged to create the world in which they live.
Careful analysis of the recent past demonstrates the close relationship between regional growth and federal spending. Reduced government expenditures, more reliance on state and local assumption
of public works projects, and the inevitable expansion of the Albuquerque area are elements in an equation that demand more
attention than heretofore given by native and newcomer alike.
Ironically, the "golden age" of western water projects is ending just
as Albuquerque attracts large numbers of Sunbelt migrants and
strains the limits of its water resources. The expertise, financial
support, and management skills of one partner in past Albuquerque
endeavors, the army engineers, cannot be ignored as the city and
its planners confront these realities and venture down the uncertain
path that awaits the region in the twenty-first century.
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